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FORMALISM IN THE ITALIAN LAW SYSTEM
1. Premise  
The reflections that follow intend to investigate the problems underlying 
the voluntary formalism1, moving first from the identification of its source and, 
subsequently, highlighting the possible differences with the forms so called 
ex lege having regard to the role and function.
The civil code, as known, expressly regulates the voluntary formalism 
in two provisions and, specifically, in the art. 1326, paragraph 42 and in the 
art. 1352 c.c.3
The different topographical location of the two norms clearly reveals 
the possible theoretical alternative that is offered to the interpreter who intends 
to approach the study of conventional formalism4.
The possible paths would seem to revolve around the following alternative: 
the voluntary formalism remains attracted to the «requisites» of contract, 
Antonio Di FeDe – Università degli Studi di Roma la „Sapienza”; e-mail: antonio.difede@uni-
roma1.it
1 Although aware of not being able to provide an exhaustive account of the doctrine which, 
over time and with differing opinions, has dealt with the study of voluntary formalism, we refer 
here to the following authors: Ant. Genovese, Le forme volontarie nella teoria dei contratti, Padova 
1949, passim; U. La Porta, Accordi sulla forma, preliminare e tecniche di formazione del contatto. 
A proposito di un recente libro, „Rass. dir. civ.” 1993, p. 529 ff.; V. Verdicchio, Forme volontarie 
ed accordo contrattuale, Napoli 2002, passim; G. Cerdonio Chiaramonte, Questioni irrisolte in-
torno ai patti sulla forma di futuri contratti, „Riv. dir. civ.” 2004, no 1, p. 241 ff.; R. Favale, Forme 
convenzionali, Torino 2013, p. 276 ff.; E. Palmerini, Forme convenzionali, in: Comm. Gabrielli, Dei 
contratti in generale, II, ed Navarretta e A. Orestano, Torino 2011, art. 1352, p. 185 ff.; A. Renda, 
Forme convenzionali, in Comm. Schlesinger, Milano 2016, passim.
2 The text of the art. 1326, paragraph 4, of the Italian Civil Code reads: «If the proposer 
requests a specific form for acceptance, the acceptance has no effect if it is given in a different form».
3 The article 1352 c.c., under the heading «Conventional forms», states that: «If the parties 
have agreed in writing to adopt a specific form for the future conclusion of a contract, it is assumed 
that the form was intended for the validity of this». (italics by the author)
4 The observation has been highlighted by V. Verdicchio, Forme volontarie, p. 34. 
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as would seem to suggest the location of the art. 1352 c.c.5 immediately after 
the articles 1350 and 1351 which enumerate the different hypotheses of solemn 
contracts. Or differently it is something that is absolutely far from the negotiating 
structure, to the point of affecting the formation of the contractual agreement, 
as would appear from the analysis of the art. 1326 paragraph 4 c.c.6
The solution to the proposed alternative is not insignificant but, on the con-
trary, influences with an overwhelming incidence the choice of the discipline 
to apply to the forms ex-voluntate, thus differentiating them from those ex lege.
Starting from the first possible reconstruction – which considers the voluntary 
form as a requisite of the contract – this suggests to the interpreter to reflect 
on a series of problems that can be summarized as follows: the assimilation 
of the conventional forms to the legal ones is admissible, above all having regard 
to the legitimation of private individuals to identify the validity requirements 
of the contract? Is it possible to discuss of an ad substantiam form established 
by private parties in the same sense in which it is mentioned for the ad sub-
stantiam form established by the law, that’s to say as a «requisite» of contract? 
Is it possible to believe that the non-observance of the conventionally chosen 
form induces to the same consequences as the non-observance of the legal form, 
and so to the nullity of the agreement?7
2. The private autonomy of the parties as the source  
of the conventional formalism
In order to answer the questions referred to, it becomes preliminary to de-
tect the source of the voluntary formalism to understand if it finds its place in 
the negotiating autonomy of private individuals or in something else.
5 It should be noted that the studies on the subject of voluntary formalism have almost 
exclusively centered on the exegesis of the norm of art. 1352 c.c. which would seem to extend to 
conventional forms the same alternative between the ad substantiam form and the ad probationem 
one. On this point, comp. F. Di Giovanni, Accordi sulla forma e accordi sulla “documentazione” 
del futuro negozio, in La forma degli atti nel diritto privato. Studi in onore di Michele Giorgianni, 
Napoli1988, p. 94: «The text of the art. 1352 cod. civ. proposes to the interpreter the question 
of voluntary forms suggesting their inclusion in the alternative between form as a structural datum 
(ad substantiam) and form as a constrained means of proof (ad probationem). The presumptive 
formulation of the provision seems to imply a clear allusion to a problem of choice between the two 
mentioned possible alternatives». On the warned need to resort to a systematic interpretation 
of the art. 1352 c.c., comp. P. Perlingieri, Forma dei negozi e formalismo degli interpreti, Napoli 1987, 
p. 137: «One thing seems certain. The article 1352, in its apparent clearness, must be connected 
and inserted into the system and cannot be read and interpreted all by itself».
6 In the approach to the study of voluntary formalism, the art. 1326, paragraph 4, differently 
from the rule of the art. 1352 c.c., had no particular consideration by the doctrine. In this regard 
and to better understand the reasons that led to the less attention paid to the rule in art. 1326, 
paragraph 4, c.c.comp. R. Sacco, Il contratto, „Tratt. dir. civ. Sacco” 1993, n. 1, p. 585.
7 The setting of the problem in the terms mentioned above was acutely investigated by 
V. Verdicchio, Forme volontarie, p. 43 ff.
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On this point the doctrine, and not only the Italian one8, has always believed 
that the voluntary formalism has its roots in the broader notion of the parties’ 
private autonomy.
However, the authoritative thought that rejected the construction of voluntary 
formalism as an expression of private autonomy, pushing towards a complete 
equation of conventional and legal forms, cannot be ignored9.The thesis just 
mentioned is based on the conviction that «private individuals do not have the 
power to design the type of negotiation, but only to determine the content»10, 
coming to believe that the articles 1326, paragraph 4 and 1352 c.c. «delegate, 
to a party or parties, the power to construct the case, and thus to make a weak 
case strong by adding the requisite of form»11.
To fully understand the argumentative path of this authoritative doctrine, 
it becomes necessary to focus the attention on the concept of «delegation» which 
constitutes the central nucleus of this theory. Basically, we need to ask ourselves 
about the configuration of the agreements on the form that the parties – by virtue 
of the «delegation» entrusted to them by the legislator – put in place once said 
that they can’t constitute manifestations of private autonomy.
On closer inspection, the aforementioned doctrine does not expressly rule 
on the point merely by adding that «The legislator delegates to the parties 
the power of composition of the case, as he himself holds and exercises»12.
With this last assumption, it would seem to be hinted that the power that 
private individuals exert in the hypotheses referred to in articles 1326, para-
graph 4 and 1325 c.c. would not be qualified in terms of autonomy, but rather 
as the same power that the legislator «holds and exercises»13.
The orientation just mentioned has been strongly criticized for two rea-
sons: firstly to validly claim that the forms chosen by private individuals have 
the same nature and strength as those prescribed by law, it should be assumed 
that the legislator has delegated to private individuals the same legislative pow-
er that it is entitled to, thus allowing the parties to set up an activity that can 
8 The reconciliation of the pact on the form in the context of the parties’ negotiating autonomy, 
finds expressed and almost unanimous recognition not only in the legal systems of Civil Law, 
but also in those of Common Law. On this subjectsee, among the others, comp. C. Gomez Salvago 
Sanchez, La forma voluntaria del contratto, Valencia 1999, passim; R.B. Schlesinger, Formation 
of Contracts. A Study of the Common Core of Legal Systems, London 1968, passim.
9 This thought, as known, belongs to N. Irti, Idolda Libertatis. Tre esercizi sul formalismo 
giuridico, Milano 1985, passim.
10 N. Irti, Idola Libertatis, p. 22.
11 N. Irti, Idola Libertatis, p. 23.
12 N. Irti, Idola Libertatis, p. 89.
13 This approach, according to Irti, would remain confirmed by the assumption that «It would 
be singular that the form, desired by the legislator, was of a different rank than that of the 
form established by the parties in the exercise of delegated power». According to the A. this last 
assumption demonstrates that legal forms and conventional ones are placed exactly on the same 
level. Consequently there would no longer be any conceptual restraint to reconcile the consequence 
of nullity to the non-observance of the voluntary forms, thus extending to the hypothesis of their 
absence the same discipline that applies to the contract missing the legal form.
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be qualified as «legislation»14. Otherwise, even if one does not want to believe 
that the legislator has stripped himself of his typical power with the delegation, 
then the rules referred to in articles 1326, paragraph 4 and 1352 c.c. should 
be qualified in the same way as «blank» rules which need the determination 
of private individuals to reach the identification of their preceptive content.
Both the alternatives referred to, as anticipated, lend themselves to signif-
icant objections. As has been effectively pointed out15, if one accepts the solu-
tion according to which the legislator wanted to delegate to the private parties 
a power that would be identify in that of legiferation, there would be a serious 
problem of harmonization with the system of the sources of law16 that hardly 
could be solved.
But even wishing to follow up the suggestion that the rules on the conven-
tional form would be considered as «blank» ones, it should in any case come 
to the conclusion that voluntary and legal forms would have the same nature 
and that, therefore, they should operate in the same way, that’s to say that they 
impose themselves on the private once chosen without possibility for them to be 
able subsequently to remove them17.
This conclusion, however, strongly clashes with the opinion, almost unan-
imous in the doctrine18 that recognizes the possibility for private individuals, 
after the choice of a conventional form, to decide not to respect it, thus revoking 
the agreement on the form at any time and because of the real interests they 
want to fullfill.
But if the parties can modify the form they had previously requested even 
disregarding it, the same could in no case be equated with the legal form since 
the latter inevitably imposes itself on private individuals. At this point, one 
should rightly consider in line with the dominant orientation, that if private 
individuals are granted to want and disregard the rules through which they 
regulate their relations, such a possibility remains limited exclusively inside 
14 On the point, and in line with the thought of Irti, comp. F. Venosta, La forma dei negozi 
preparatori e revocatori, Milano 1997, p. 308: «As well as, in fact, the legislator can insert in 
the contractual case the requirement of the written form, in the same way he can delegate others 
to do so; it is the same power, which the legislator can exercise directly or by delegation, without 
giving rise to a breach of the principles».
15 V. Verdicchio, Forme volontarie…, p. 49.
16 On the need of a careful harmonization of the sources of law, we refer to the enlightening 
considerations of P. Perlingieri, L’ordinamento vigenti e i suoi valori. Problemi del diritto civile, 
Napoli 2006, p. 46 ff. where extensive bibliographical references can be found.
17 V. Verdicchio, Forme volontarie, p. 52: «In other words, if the election of the form by private 
individuals would be an example of the law making technique per relationem envisaged by the 
“blank” rules referred to in articles 1326 paragraph 4 and 1352 of the civil code, it should be con-
sidered that, once the form has been chosen, the preceptive content of these rules is definitively 
established. And since it would be a matter of legal forms at this point, private individuals could 
not further dispose of them and would remain irretrievably subject to them». 
18 The pact on the form is generally classified as a bilateral contract that can certainly be 
revoked at the request of the parties. On this topic comp. F. Gazzoni, Manuale di diritto privato, 
VIIª ed., Napoli 2007, p. 868; G. Mirabelli, Dei contratti in generale, Padova 1980, p. 218ff.
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the perimeter of the exercise of private autonomy, leaving no space for a legislative 
«power of delegation». Hence the consideration of the impossibility of explaining 
voluntary formalism as a phenomenon unrelated to private autonomy19.
3. Legal forms and conventional forms:  
the problem of the negotiating pathology  
of informal contracts
Having acknowledged that traditional opinion identifies the source of volun-
tary formalism in negotiating autonomy, we should now ask ourselves whether 
the form agreed by private individuals may or may not occupy the same place 
and fulfill the same function as the legal form20 and, specifically, of the form ad 
substantiam21. It is necessary, in essence, to ask oneself about the possibility 
to attribute to the forms ex-voluntate the same role performed by those ex lege, 
arriving to configure them as a «requisite» of the contract whose absence would 
lead to the nullity of it.
19 The impossibility of explaining conventional forms in a different way, is emphasized by 
P. Perlingieri, Forma dei negozi, p. 39, when he asks himself: «As indeed explain the voluntary 
form without resorting to autonomy […]?»; and when he states: «what is right is to consider this 
norm (art. 1352 c.c.) as an expression of autonomy». 
20 The attention to the functional profile of the prescriptions on the form suggests to the 
interpreter to identify the real interests that justify their prevision and, at the same time, to 
verify their merit in the light of the values  characterizing the entire order. On the topic comp. 
P. Perlingieri, Manuale di diritto civile, 8ª ed., Napoli 2018, p. 503: «Primary importance is assumed 
by the identification of the single “sufficient reason” of the norm on the form [...]. This functional 
perspective of form, which requires the interpreter to look for the “why” of the prescription, urges 
a different identification of the regular/exceptional and mandatory/derogable character. The axio-
logical-constitutional interest, which is the basis of the legislation on form, represents the compass 
with which the jurist moves in the interpretation and qualification of the single rule».
21 It should be noted that the traditional doctrine has generally affirmed the exceptional na-
ture of the forms ad substantiam based on the existence of a general principle of freedom of forms. 
This principle, as known, has undergone vigorous criticism by N. Irti, Idola libertatis, p. 79 ff. 
The A. believes that from the letter of the norm in art. 1325 c.c. «Two standards can be removed. 
One describes a weak case, resulting from the combination of three requirements (agreement, 
cause, object); the other, a strong case, resulting from the combination of four requirements 
(agreement, cause, object, form)». The descriptive norm of the «weak» case is not configurable 
as a rule on the form but it is exclusively referable to the agreement. Consequently, the only and 
exclusive norm on the form is that referred to in paragraph 4 of the art. 1325 c.c. and precisely 
because of its singularity it cannot be configured as an exceptional rule. In the opinion of another 
authoritative doctrine «the evocative approach under consideration which has even aroused criti-
cism even within the logic of legal formalism and the structural conception of form, of which it is 
an elegant testimony, has, more than any other, the merit of having given a jolt to the affirmed 
indiscriminate exceptional nature of the statutory norms for negotiating legal forms». We refer to 
P. Perlingieri, Il diritto dei contratti fra persona e mercato. Problemi del diritto civile, Napoli 2003, 
p. 97 ff. If, however, the Author continues, «the exceptional rule is defined in the relationship 
with the general rules and with other laws, this means that this qualification cannot be limited 
to the exclusive comparison with a single principle or rule, but a comparison between the single 
provision and the entire order is needed».
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Indeed, if one looks at the formal requirement as an element of the structure 
of the contract in spite of any evaluation of the function it is required to perform, 
one would have the impression that the two species of form occupy the same place 
in the structure of the case.
If, on the other hand, the analysis is also oriented towards an evaluation 
dimension that is careful to grasp the actual interests at stake, the situation 
changes22. In fact, while the conventional forms constitute, as previously ob-
served, a manifestation of the exercise of the autonomy of negotiations aimed 
at the protection and realization of private interests that belong to the subjects 
that have them, the legal formalism aims at protecting general and superior 
interests23. 
It cannot be overlooked how such an assumption has been criticized by those 
who have considered that on several occasions, and more and more frequently, 
the legislator has set hypotheses of nullity directly protecting one of the con-
tracting parties and therefore an interest – at least immediately – «private»24.
On this point, however, the most careful doctrine25 has not failed to point 
out that the interests protected in these particular hypotheses always tran-
scend the purely particular and private dimension. Just think of the hypotheses 
of nullity of protection imposed on the protection of consumers26 to realize how 
such a statement, far from the protection of the private interest of the individual 
consumer, concerns the generality of the subjects so called weak27. But even 
if a nullity of protection is not going to offer a generalized protection  but only 
22 On this point the observations of P. Perlingieri, Forma dei negozi, p. 45: «the distinction 
between structure and function cannot be translated into separation and therefore into exclusion 
of one of the two, since each “how” of law always has a “why” juridically relevant» (the italics are 
of the A.)
23 More generally, it is observed that the modern function of the legal form is identified 
in the desire to make the contractual relationship as clear as possible in order to protect the po-
sition of the contractors and, in particular, of the weak parties. On this topic comp. F. Camilletti, 
Le varie funzioni della forma nel diritto privato, http://www.biblio.liuc.it/pagineita.asp?codice 
=82Castellanza (VA): LIUC, 2005.
24 The thought goes to a vast range of hypotheses introduced by the special legislation 
of community derivation, above all in the matter of protection of the so called consumer. On the 
topic comp. N. Lipari, Nullità (nella legislazione di derivazione comunitaria), „Dig. disc. priv., Sez. 
civ.” 1996, v. 16, p. 673 ff.; G. Gioia, Nuove nullità relative a tutela del contraente debole, „Contr. 
impr.” 1999, p. 1332 ff.; G. Alpa, Consumatore (tutela del), „Noviss. Dig. it., Appendice” 1981, 
n. 2, p. 516 ff.; Id., Il diritto di consumatori, Roma–Bari 1995, passim; G. Chinè, Il consumatore, 
in Diritto privato europeo, 1, ed. N. Lipari, Padova 1997, p. 164 ff.
25 With reference to the interests belonging to the so called weak’s categories, has been 
observed by A. Gentili, Le invalidità, in: I contratti in generale, ed. E. Gabrielli, Torino 1999, 
p. 1347, that «we are talking about interests that it is inappropriate to define as particular interests, 
both because they are serial, and therefore widely generalized, and because they are intertwined 
with the general interest of a mass society that requires for its balance the protections of weak 
contractors and rules of economic action». 
26 In terms of consumer protection, literature is very wide. For the only purpose of a general 
overview, comp. the authors cited in note 22.
27 These are «serial» interests, so that, in these hypotheses, «the general interest absorbs the 
private serial interest»: A. Gentili, Le invalidità, p. 1377.
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and exclusively to safeguard a single weak part, it would be misleading to con-
sider such interest as merely private.
This consideration would find a secure foothold in the circumstance that 
in juridical system such as ours which places the protection of the human 
person and the promotion of his full and free development at the center of it, 
any hypothesis of nullity that contributes to its implementation would always 
be characterized by a valence that transcends the strictly private dimension28. 
If, therefore, the legal and conventional forms cannot be put on the same level 
because functionally directed to the protection of different interests, it would 
then be unreasonable to come to affirm that the defect of these latter produces 
the same consequence, such as the invalidity sub specie nullitatis.
In support of these theses it has been argued, among other things, that 
on a merely logical level that segment of the nullity discipline represented by 
the institution of conversion could never be applied to the contract  missing 
of the voluntary form29.
This consideration alone would be sufficient to doubt about the validity 
of the juxtaposition of conventional and legal forms, apparently descending from 
the letter of the art. 1352 c.c. Furthermore, the lack of distinction between con-
ventional and legal forms, would bring to extend to the latter the same discipline 
of the former with the consequence that the nullity of the «informal» contract 
could be asserted by anyone interested in it, as well as being taken over auto-
matically (article 1421 c.c.); the action to enforce it would be imprescriptible 
(art. 1422 c.c.) and the contract would be incurable (art. 1423 c.c.)30.
But the application of such normative treatment to the hypothesis of inob-
servance of the conventionally agreed form would seem inadequate if only one 
looked at the quality of the interests at stake31.
But if the nullity cannot be the right answer to the non-observance 
of the conventional formalities, it is necessary to ask if it is possible to config-
ure the invalidity expressly referred to by the rule of the art. 1352 c.c. in terms 
other than nullity.
28 On the topic comp. P. Perlingieri, Il diritto civile nella legalità costituzionale secondo il siste-
ma italo-comunitario delle fonti, Napoli 2006, p. 305, according to which the constitutional system 
«overcomes the myth of the superindividual purpose by not conceiving a higher interest than that 
of the full development of man. The latter constitutes a fundamental principle of public order».
29 Thus G. Mirabelli, La forma volontaria nell’art. 1352 cod. civ., „Vita not.” 1957, p. 597: 
«to the contract which do not observe the conventional form is not applicable any of the institutions 
proper to the case of the null act»; Id., Dei contratti in generale, Torino 1980, p. 220.
30 It cannot be doubted that the lack of an ad hoc legal form determines the radical nullity 
of the contract, with the consequent joint application of all the aforementioned legislation.
31 On this point comp. P. Perlingieri, Forma dei negozi, p. 145: «certainly the interests 
that assume importance in the predetermination of conventional forms are by definition available 
and the qualification of the invalidity resulting from the failure to comply with such a form can-
not but be compatible with the nature of the interests that underlie it. It would be in this respect 
incongruous to pigeonhole the case in that of nullity so called absolute and mechanically extend 
that discipline».
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4. Annulment as a possible remedy  
to the non-observance of conventional forms
This is the attempt conducted by a part of the doctrine32 who, recognizing 
the inadequacy of the sanction of nullity, is not able however to detach the volun-
tary forms from the context of the invalidity of the negotiation, coming to resort 
to the sanction of annulment.
This solution would appear to have a double advantage over the use of nullity: 
on the one hand it would allow us to explain the sanability of the contract which 
doesn’t respect the chosen form thanks to the validation (convalida) pursuant to 
art. 1444 c.c.; on the other it would be better harmonized with the widespread 
opinion that wants annulment as a tool to protect strictly private interests33.
But even the recourse to the annulment discipline has raised more than 
a few doubts. With particular reference to the operation of the institution 
of validation, there was no lack of those who considered that this instrument 
is not applicable to the hypothesis under examination34. It has been observed, 
in fact, that the conventional forms chosen by the parties must necessarily 
be eliminated by mutual agreement between them, since a unilateral decision 
such as validation cannot be sufficient35.
It would follow that the inapplicability of such a significant and qualifying 
segment of the discipline of annulment entails its complete non-application36.
Indeed, the arguments mentioned do not seem fully acceptable. And this be-
cause it could well happen that the parties jointly decide to apply a certain form 
32 On this point comp. O. Prosperi, Forme complementari e atto recettizio, „Riv. dir. comm.” 
1976, n., p. 208; P. Trimarchi, Appunti sull’invalidità del negozio giuridico, „Temi” 1955, passim; 
G.B. Ferri, Il negozio giuridico tra libertà e forma, Rimini 1992, p. 165; M. Giorgianni, Forma degli 
atti (dir. priv.), in: Enc. dir., Milano 1968, p. 997, where the author speaks expressly of an invalidity 
«which, however, does not belong to the type of “nullity” drawn by the legislator, as it can only be 
asserted by the interested party, which therefore can renounce it, as it can execute the contract».
33 In hindsight, the idea that annulment is instrumental to the protection of necessarily private 
interests has found penetrating criticism on the part of those who have highlighted how such an 
assumption does not always correspond to the truth, since there are recognizable cases in which, 
instead, «the protected interest is general». Thus A. Gentili, Le invalidità, p. 1377.
34 Comp., among the others, F. Messineo, Il contratto in genere, in: Tratt. dir. civ. e comm., 
1, directed by A. Cicu e F. Messineo, Milano 1972, p. 151: «the agreement on the form binds both 
parties and, therefore, it cannot be derogated by only one of them».
35 On this point, for further investigation, comp. R. Favale, Forme “extralegali” e autonomia 
negoziale, Napoli 1994, p. 282: «the terms agreed by the parties, even in the case of protection 
of only one party, cannot be unilaterally eliminated, especially if the violation arises from 
the behavior of the interested contractor, otherwise the existence of the constraint would be 
subordinated to the mere whim of the subject. The establishment of a commitment regarding 
the “appearance” of the definitive contract, indeed, links both parties to the respect of the same, 
except for the possibility of a different intention of bilateral order». In the same way F. Messineo, 
Il contratto in genere, p. 151 ff.
36 It should be pointed out that some authors have proposed the possibility of having recourse 
to the discipline of nullity so called relative (nullità relativa). Comp. E. Betti, Teoria generale del 
negozio giuridico, 2ª ed., Torino 1955, p. 471; F. Gazzoni, Manuale di diritto privato, Napoli 2007, 
p. 869, according to whome the nullity can be «relied on only by the interested party»; V. Roppo, 
Il contratto, in: Tratt. di dir. priv., Iudica e Zatti, Milano 2001, p. 248.
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to the future contract but, then, only one of them wants to waive the formal-
ity previously agreed upon thus disregarding it. Well, in such an eventuality 
the part who, on the other hand, would not have modified the agreement on the 
form could well decide to «unilaterally» validate the informal contract as it is 
equally capable of satisfying its concrete interests. And again, since the annulment 
is only objectionable by the party in whose interest it was arranged, this part 
could renounce to claim it thus safeguarding the contract materially concluded.
5. The ineffectiveness of the contract as a possible 
consequence of non-compliance  
with the agreements on the form
The brief observations made so far could justify a corrective interpretation 
of the art. 1352 c.c. in the part in which the «validity» of the contract is connected 
to the respect of the form conventionally agreed upon by the parties. Moreover, 
the aforementioned article, talking of «validity» does not clarify from which form 
of pathology the contract concluded in disregard of the formal requirement would 
be drawn. In this regard it is noted that if the legislator wanted to refer to the 
nullity rather than to the annulment, he would have explicitly mentioned it in the 
same way as the other rules in which these sanctions are explicitly indicated37.
It is interesting to note that in another rule, and specifically that referred 
to in art. 1398 c.c. with regard to the contract concluded by the falsus procurator, 
the legislator used the same term «validity».
It is well known that, according to the dominant opinion38, the art. 1398 c.c. 
doesn’t integrate a hypothesis of invalidity, but one of ineffectiveness strictu senso. 
This consideration could lead to believe that also in the provision of art. 1352 
c.c. the legislator, far from referring to a hypothesis of invalidity in a technical 
sense, has wanted to link the event of the non-observance of the conventional 
form to the inability of the contract to produce any effect39.
37 V. Verdicchio, Forme volontarie, p. 152: «It seems logical to think that, if the legisla-
tor had really wanted to equate the voluntary forms with the legal ones, he would have used 
in the art. 1352 c.c. the same concept of nullity specifically used for the latter in the two immedi-
ately preceding articles».
38 On this point comp. for all. C.M. Bianca, Diritto civile, v. 3: Il contratto, Milano 2000, p. 107 ff.
39 It seems interesting to note that the letter of the norm in art. 1352 c.c. uses instead 
of the negative lemma «invalidity», the positive one «validity». While the former has a very specific 
dogmatic meaning in the general theory of the contract, the latter is sometimes used in a more 
neutral sense to designate the general attitude of an act to produce effects.
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6. The “constitutive” function of the voluntary formalism: 
relationship between the rule of art. 1326 paragraph 4 
and that referred to in art. 1352 c.c.
From what has been said so far, the article 1352 c.c. expresses clearly the 
idea that the parties can foresee a voluntary form in «constitutive function», 
that is for the purposes of the validity of a future contract. Now it remains 
to wonder what it can consist of.
As mentioned in the introduction, the conventional forms are to be individ-
uated in two precise provisions and specifically in the article 1326 paragraph 
4 c.c. and in the article 1352 c.c.
According to the article 1326 paragraph 4 c.c. acceptance «has no effect» 
if it is given in a form other than that requested by the proposer. There is no 
doubt that the provision in question intends to express the idea that acceptance 
formally different from what is required by the proposal is not suitable in order 
to reach the conclusion of the contract.
The clause of the proposal referred to in paragraph 4 of the article 1326 c.c. 
would perform the function of introducing, in the contract formation process40, 
a further and distinct interest of the proposer from which the «an» of the con-
tract depends.
To identify the type of this interest, the doctrine believes that the term «form» 
mentioned in article 1326 c.c. has a much wider extension than the concept 
of form referred to in article 1350 c.c. embracing all the possible methods re-
lating to the quomodo fiat of acceptance41: not only those relating to the form 
of the negotiation, but also those relating to the subject to whom the acceptance 
is sent or to the place to send it42.
40 The procedural technique of the exchange of the proposal and acceptance pursuant 
to art. 1326 c.c., is only one of the ways in which the agreement can be formed. In fact, it can also 
be achieved in a less simple and linear way, i.e. passing through the negotiation phase. At this 
stage, the parties begin to discuss the deal by exchanging the data, information and opinions 
they deem necessary. It is clear that, during the negotiations, the parties still have no intention 
of binding themselves, also because most of the time they have not even elaborated a text which fully 
expresses the regulation of their interests. This is the issue of the so called progressive training 
of the contract (or agreement and consent), which gives rise to the obvious difficulty of identify-
ing precisely not only when, but before that, whether the agreement has been reached or not. On 
this topic comp. F. Carnelutti, Formazione progressiva del contratto, „Riv. dir. comm.” 2016, n. 2, 
p. 308 ff.; V. Roppo, Il contratto, p. 137 ff.; V. Ricciuto, La formazione progressiva del contratto, 
in: I contratti in generale,1, ed. E. Gabrielli, Torino 2006, p. 151 ff.; P. Gallo, Conclusione del contratto, 
in Comm. Gabrielli, Dei contratti in generale, 1, ed. Navaretta e A. Orestano, Torino 2011, p. 252 ff.
41 On the wideness of the concept of form pursuant to art. 1326 c.c. comp., among the others, 
A. Ravazzoni, La formazione del contratto, Milano 1973, p. 129 ff.; G. Castiglia, Manifestazione 
(dir. civ.), in: Enc. giur., v. 19, Roma 1990, p. 1 ff.; A.M. Benedetti, Autonomia privata procedimen-
tale. La formazione del contratto fra legge e volontà delle parti, Torino 2002, p. 317 ff.
42 In this way A. Genovese, Le formalità dell’accettazione stabilite dal proponente, „Riv. dir. 
civ.” 1996, n. 1, p. 364: «The formalities imposed on acceptance are of various types and nature: 
the proposer can establish that the acceptance is expressed in a specific form (written or public), 
perhaps with certain requirements; that the acceptance is presented to him personally or to another 
person whom he indicates; that it is addressed to a predetermined place». 
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In other words, the rule referred to in paragraph 4 of the article 1326 c.c. 
offers the possibility to the proposer of including in the formative procedure of the 
case additional interests with respect to the final ones – such as those connected 
to «how» and «where» – which directly affect the conclusion of the contract43.
Since the procedural technique referred to in article 1326 c.c., requesting 
the voluntary contribution of two distinct parts, it is clear that the proposal, 
considered alone in itself, is not suitable to satisfy any interest expressed by 
it until it meets an acceptance that expresses the same convenience of the other 
part to conclude the same contract44.
It follows that the clause of the proposal pursuant to paragraph 4 
of the article 1326 c.c. would limit itself to delineate the boundaries within which 
the proposer intends to bind himself to the contractual commitment, with the 
consequence that the acceptance that is not compliant to what is required by this 
clause would not achieve the completeness of the consent so that the contractual 
situation could be completed45.
And then, if the request for a particular form – whichh is an expression of the 
overall set of interests that the proposer aims to achieve – requires a compliant 
acceptance for the purposes of concluding the contract, it could reasonably be 
assumed that the rule on voluntary formalism of article 1326 paragraph 4 c.c. 
directly affects the formation of the agreement46.
If one adheres to such a conclusion, having taken note of the affinity between 
the aforementioned rule and that referred to in article 1352 c.c, it would not be 
foolish to imagine that even the agreements on the form affect the coming into 
existence of the contractual case.
But if this were the case, it remains to explain what is the difference between 
this hypothesis and the one referred to in paragraph 4 of the article 1326 c.c.
43 V. Verdicchio, Forme volontarie e procedimento di formazione del contratto, „Riv. dir. priv.” 
2018, n. 2, p. 188: «the contract formation process is, ultimately, not only a tool for selecting and 
composing the final interests, but also a means of selecting and satisfying the interests connected 
to the time, the way and the place of sending the acceptance; that is, it is a tool that can affect 
not only the content of the commitment, but also the time, the way and the place of its making».
44 V. Verdicchio, Forme volontarie, p. 186: «since the proposal and the acceptance are necessary 
to prepare the content of the contract in fieri, that is the set of clauses that express the negotiating 
regulation (net of the possible additions and/or corrections made by the heteronomous sources), 
it seems evident that the conformity of the one to the other is the result – with reference to the 
final interests that the contract will have to reveal and regulate – of a full content congruency, 
which occurs, precisely, when they express the same contractual content».
45 On the principle of the so called completeness of the agreement comp. L. Mosco, Difformità 
tra proposta contrattuale e accettazione, „Dir. giur.” 1948, p. 215; A. Gallo, Trattative precontrat-
tuali e perfezionamento del contratto, „Giur. completa Cass. civ.” 1954, n. 2, p. 160 ff.; A. Candian, 
Questioni in tema di formazione dei contratti, „Riv. dir. comm.” 1916, p. 859.
46 The aforementioned consideration would induce the interpreter to believe that the theme 
of conventional formalism is a phenomenon to be placed in the context of the formative phase 
of the contractual case, coming to influence his coming into existence. For more information on 
this point, comp. V. Verdicchio, Forme volontarie, passim.
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The difference, as suggested by careful doctrine47, would be to identify 
in the circumstance that in the hypothesis of paragraph 4 of the art. 1326 
c.c. there is a «clause that is an integral part of a declaration that expresses 
a decision that is already potentially definitive and binding»48 and therefore 
supported by the animus obligandi. It follows that if the contract is not perfected 
it is not because the declarations are free of the animus obligandi, but because 
of the lack of full compliance between the proposal and acceptance.
Otherwise, the space in which the agreements on the form referred to 
in article 1352 c.c. can only be opened with reference to declarations that still 
lack the animus obligandi and therefore, in themselves, not binding. As if to 
say that, when the parties agree that the future contract will come into being in 
a certain form – in this the «constitutive» function of the latter consists – they 
are mutually clarifying that they do not intend to bind themselves without 
that precise vestimentum and that, therefore, all the statements up to that 
moment already made or to be carried out are not and will not be supported by 
the animus obligandi.
In other words, the difference between the rule of article 1326 paragraph 4 
and that referred to in article 1352 c.c. is closely connected to the different cir-
cumstance for which, in the dynamics of the formation of the contract, in the first 
hypothesis we have a part that directs to the other a real contractual proposal, 
already in itself suitable to reach the completion of the agreement, and in the 
second one two parts that face each other to start a complex negotiation phase.
Thus, when a subject already decided to conclude a contract intends to 
formulate a specific proposal to another, and also has an interest in having 
the contract perfected in a specific way and/or in a specific form, he may include 
in the proposal the clause referred to in paragraph 4 of article 1326 c.c. When, 
on the other hand, two subjects simply intend to discuss a deal, without either 
of them being able or willing to formulate a proposal, they, to avoid remaining 
bound without the desired form, may agree that the contract will not be concluded 
until the moment in which the respective wills will be expressed in that form49.
Both in one case and another, it should however be assumed that the con-
stitutive function of the voluntary forms always detects only for the purposes 
of perfecting the contractual case, affecting the formation of the agreement.
47 See for all F. Gazzoni, Manuale di diritto private, p. 841: «the proposal is a declaration 
of objectivity, characterized on the objective level, by the completeness of the device content 
that must prefigure the contractual one, with which it will be identified once the acceptance 
of the acceptor is identified. On the subjective level, then, the intention to unconditionally bind oneself 
to that given set of interests must be inferred from the context of the declaration». Again on this 
point V. Roppo, Il contratto, in Collana di diritto privato, Milano 2011, p. 101. The A. clarifies that 
“the proposal must not contain, or be accompanied by, reservations about its currently binding 
nature”.
48 F. Gazzoni, Manuale, p. 842.
49 The relevance of the agreement on the form pursuant to art. 1352 c.c. on the negotiation 
phase is also highlighted by E. Betti, Teoria generale del negozio, p. 289, when he states that the 
agreement must intervene before the conclusion of a given regulation of interests, that is, ultimately, 
«both in the course of negotiations and in view of them».
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The conclusion reached is not, however, free from objections and needs some 
further clarification.
And this is because if it is absolutely certain that in the hypothesis referred 
to in paragraph 4 of the article 1326 c.c. we do not reach the conclusion of the 
contractual case in absence of an acceptance that fully complies also with the 
formal prescriptions required, a different consideration should be pointed out 
for the agreements on the form pursuant to article 1352 c.c.
The problem is in all its evidence when the parties decide to conclude 
the future contract by observing a specific form and, subsequently, enter into 
the conclusion of the contract but informally. In such an eventuality, if one 
wanted to adhere to the thesis that sees the voluntary formalism connected 
to the formation of the agreement, it should be considered that the contract 
actually concluded is completely new and different from the original regulation 
of interests which, in practice, has never arose. This conclusion does not indeed 
appear fully acceptable.
7. The revocation of the agreement on the form
In the hypothesis just mentioned, we face a further operational problem 
that the voluntary forms raise: quid iuris of the contract that the parties, without 
observing the form previously agreed for it, effectively and intentionally conclude 
verbis or by facta concludentia? 
It could well happen that a party contests the concluded contract without 
observing the chosen form denouncing the invalidity, and the other objects that 
they have renounced the agreed form by the very fact of having intended to 
conclude the contract without abiding by it.
The doctrine, on the assumption that the pact on the form is a bilateral 
contract50, usually faces the problem in terms of silent withdrawal or by facta 
concludentia of the convention on the form. If, in fact, it cannot be revoked 
in doubt that the parties can, in the free exercise of their autonomy, reconsider 
their interests and deem the previously agreed vestimentum no longer necessary, 
it is discussed whether a silent withdrawal of the agreement is admissible as 
a consequence of having concluded the contract informally.
The problem that has been advanced concerns the possibility that the rev-
ocation must necessarily cover the written form if the agreement on the form 
has been, in turn, concluded in writing51.
50 On this topic comp. F. Gazzoni, Manuale, p. 868; G. Mirabelli, Dei contratti in generale, 
3ª ed., Torino 1980, p. 218.
51 Regarding the problem of the form of revocatory agreements, there are conflicting posi-
tions in the doctrine. See, even if in the diversity of opinions and suggested solutions, G. Deiana, 
Contrarius consensus, „Riv. dir. priv.” 1939, p. 89 ff.; A. La Torre, La forma dei negozi solutori, 
„Giust. civ.” 1(1962), p. 155 ff.; A. Luminoso, Il mutuo dissenso, Milano 1980, passim; G. Capozzi, 
Il mutuo dissenso nella pratica notarile, „Vita not.” 1993, p. 637 ff. 
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It is well known, in fact, that according to a certain doctrinal direction52, 
the matter of the form of the revocatory agreements would be governed by a prin-
ciple of symmetry in the mind of which the revocation should take the same form 
as the contract that it is going to remove. In such a perspective a revocation by 
facta concludentia of a pact on the form concluded in writing would not be valid.
Indeed, such an orientation is not that of the majority doctrine53. The agree-
ment on the revocation is to be considered functionally autonomous by the contract 
it goes to resolve, and so for it could never be required the same form as the main 
contract. The problem relating to the form of the revocatory agreements would 
be right to place themselves exclusively for the contrarii actus of the contracts 
where a specific form ad substiantiam is required by the law and not also for 
the contracts that, independently of any legal prescription, the parties have in 
any case and freely stipulated in writing.
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BRIEF REFLECTIONS ABOUT VOLUNTARY FORMALISM  
IN THE ITALIAN LAW SYSTEM
SUMMARY
The essay deals with the complex issue of voluntary formalism, regulated in the articles 1326 
paragraph 4 and 1352 of the Italian Civil Code, and the exegetical problems connected to it. 
The study aims to verify whether the voluntary formalism occupies the same role or not and fulfills 
the same functions as the legal formalism. Then the relationship between the voluntary forms 
and the classic pathologies related to contracts has been investigated in order to verify the possi-
bility of tracing the whole theme of the forms chosen by the parties within the different problem 
of the formation of the contractual agreement.
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